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I. INTRODUCTION
This symposium-Shall These Bones Live? The Resurrection of
Truth in American Law and Public Discourse-is about truth. The
reference to possible resurrection suggests that something has hap-
pened to truth in America. There has been a death.
The title of the symposium also refers to American law and public
discourse, suggesting that what happens to truth has serious con-
sequences for our lives together.
Perhaps most fundamentally, the title poses a question-Shall
These Bones Live? This question implies that law and public dis-
course in America today are only a skeleton-no longer the living
body they once were-but that they still retain a possible promise
of a future return to full life.
Recognizing this death while still retaining hope for a healthy fu-
ture is the origin and goal of this symposium. The question is how
* Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law. My thanks to my research
assistants, Joshua Allenberg and Megan Malone for their assistance in the preparation of
this paper. Duquesne is a place of open dialogue, so it is difficult to single out people here
for thanks. But I do want to acknowledge Richard Gaffney and John Rago for their com-
ments, Ron Ricci for a 35-year dialogue across the political aisle, and, especially, Jane Mori-
arty, who closely read, and made crucial suggestions on, each draft of this paper-some of
which I accepted. Jane embodies all the qualities that you would want in a Dean of Scholar-
ship. I also want to note the legacy of my friend and teacher Robert Taylor, whose habits of
mind, even after his retirement, continue to mold Duquesne University School of Law.
21
Duquesne Law Review
to move forward in concrete ways that honor the seriousness of our
crisis and yet address the future that may still be ours.
My contribution to the symposium responds to the task of going
forward by asking four questions: what is the death of truth?; what
are its origins?; what can be done?; and what will the resurrection
of truth accomplish?
I will state my conclusions at the outset. The death of truth is
not about truth as such at all. It is about trust-trust both in each
other and in the universe. We lack truth in public life because we
lack trust. Lying politicians did not cause this lack of trust. Such
politicians are beneficiaries of it. So, to resurrect truth in American
law and public discourse, we must restore trust. Restoring trust is
ultimately a spiritual issue, which, given our society's seculariza-
tion, will require a new understanding of the nature of religion and
spiritual life, and a new willingness among secular people to be
open to this realm. This spiritual path is the way to restore demo-
cratic life-to regain self-government.
II. WHAT IS THE DEATH OF TRUTH?
When Time Magazine asked on its April 3, 2017 cover Is Truth
Dead?,' it was asking a question on the minds of many of us. But,
it turns out that the death of truth is not what it appears to be at
first.
The story accompanying the cover assumed that the death of
truth has to do with President Trump's ability to get away with tell-
ing lies.2 So, for example, President Trump would say that his in-
auguration crowd was larger than that of President Obama or that
he would have received a higher popular vote total then Hillary
Clinton if only illegally registered voters had not been permitted to
vote-obvious untruths-yet his supporters accept what Trump
says as true.3 In a way, Time Magazine agreed with President
Trump's statement to the magazine that "[t]he country believes
me."4
The New York Times in a June 4, 2017 article illustrated this
understanding of the death of truth as the inability to identify a lie,
in a story about a high school teacher in Wellston, Ohio-Trump
1. See D.W. Pine, Is Truth Dead? Behind the Time Cover, TIME (Mar. 23, 2017),
http://time.com/4709920/donald-trump-truth-time-cover.
2. See Nancy Gibbs, When a President Can't be Taken at His Word, TIME (Mar. 23, 2017),
http://time.com/4710615/donald-trump-truth-falsehoods.
3. Id.




country-where, the headline proclaimed, students were stub-
bornly rejecting the facts of climate change.5 In the story, general
skepticism about climate change is exhibited by the students and a
straight-A student bolts from class rather than watch a documen-
tary that explained the science of global warming. Afterward, this
student said, "'It was just so biased toward saying that climate
change is real.. And that all these people that I pretty much am like
are wrong and stupid."
The New York Times story played up all the elements of the
death-of-truth narrative that is the current conventional wisdom.
The point of the story was that Trump supporters in red-state ex-
traction industry areas reject obvious and accepted scientific find-
ings. From this perspective, the death of truth would seem to be
merely a problem of educating the ignorant-a sort of home-grown
colonial project.
Except that the story did not actually exhibit that lesson. Even-
tually, most of the students in the class, seemingly including the
student who had bolted,6 could see perfectly well that humans were
changing the planet's climate and that something had to be done
about it. So, ultimately, the early skepticism about global warming
represented simple resistance to a narrative that would undermine
the prospects for industries that support the local economy.
That should not be called the death of truth, but a lack of trust
that climate change proponents will take the interests of this com-
munity into account. That is why the theme of disdain-shown-to-
people-like-me is so important.
There is nothing here that could not be overcome by sharing the
burden of fighting climate change rather than crowing about closing
coal mines.7 Those students knew who was going to pay the price
of fighting global warming. It was not going to be people in New
York City. It was going to be their communities that paid the price.
5. Amy Harmon, Climate Change Meets A Stubborn Obstacle: Students, N.Y. TIMES
(June 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/201 7/06/04/us/education-climate-change-science-
class-students.html? r=0.
6. It is not clear whether the student who had bolted acknowledged that humans are to
blame for global warming or whether she only acknowledged that others in her circle of
friends so believed. See id. (stating, perhaps ambiguously, that the student responded, "I
know," when informed that her circle of friends, including her prom date, believed that hu-
mans are to blame for global warming).
7. Lauren Carroll, In Context: Hillary Clinton's Comments About Coal Jobs, POLITIFACT
(May 10, 2016, 12:01 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2016/may/10/con-
text-hillary-clintons-comments-about-coal-jobs/. In context, Hilary Clinton's statement
about closing coal mines was not really callous. But it was politically disastrous: "So for
example, I'm the only candidate which has a policy about how to bring economic opportunity
using clean renewable energy as the key into coal country. Because we're going to put a lot
of coal miners and coal companies out of business, right?" Id.
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Why should they not be hostile to such a message? Thus, what is
called the death of truth is often actually a failure to earn people's
trust. It may not be the case that the President is believed. Plenty
of Trump supporters may know, for example, that most steel and
coal jobs are gone for good.8 But they trust Trump not to betray
them-to do the best for them that he can. They don't necessarily
believe his claims.
But isn't there a great deal of acceptance of untruth in American
public life? There is, but it still represents a failure of trust. Trump
supporters hang on to untruthful narratives because they don't
trust his critics. A Trump supporter, Al Ameling, perfectly illus-
trated this distrust in another article in the New York Times, when
he stated, referring to the media criticism of then President-elect
Trump, "The way it is nowadays, unless I see positive proof, it's all
a lie."9 This insistence on irrefutable proof from those we don't trust
can lead to the acceptance of false ideas, because no proof contrary
to one's already established preference will ever be "positive"
enough.
Distrust works this way on the political left as well. Consider the
resistance to scientific reassurances about vaccines and genetically
modified food.10 Or, consider the insistence by her supporters that
the Clinton Campaign join in election recounts when, before the
election, all official sources had declared that hacking the vote was
impossible." Or the distrust of Fox News, as if Fox never could get
anything right.12 But in September, I read about a new batch of
pay-to-play emails involving the Clinton State Department on the
Fox News Website1 3 that I don't remember seeing in the New York
Times.
The unwillingness of the left to take charges against Secretary
Clinton seriously looks to supporters of President Trump like the
8. See Bruce Ledewitz, The Role of Religiously Affiliated Law Schools in the Renewal of
American Democracy, 12 U. MASS. L. REV. 230, 243 (2017).
9. Trip Gabriel, In Iowa, Trump Voters Are Unfazed by Controversies, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/us/donald-trump-iowa-conservatives.html
[https://perma.cc/FFG6-T38U].
10. See Bruce Ledewitz, Is Religion a Non-Negotiable Aspect of Liberal Constitutional-
ism?, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 209, 231 n.120 (2017).
11. See generally Tal Kopan, No, the Presidential Election Can't Be Hacked, CNN (Oct.
19, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/19/politics/election-day-russia-hacking-explainedlin-
dex.html.
12. See, e.g., Sarah Jones, How Trump is Creating a Propaganda State, NEW REPUBLIC
(Aug. 30, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/144592/trump-creating-propaganda-state.
13. See Brooke Singman, 'Pay to Play' at Clinton State Department Exposed in New





very same kind of unreasonableness that the left attributes to sup-
porters of President Trump. And in the case of Fox News, the rea-
son for the unwillingness to take anything reported by Fox seriously
is a distrust of Clinton's critics very similar to that expressed by Mr.
Ameling. Unless there is positive proof from Fox-and no proof
would ever be positive enough-it is considered all lies.1 4
Truth and trust are intimately related because without trust,
truth is impossible to attain. As the Jesuit Philosopher Bernard
Lonergan points out, the scientist does not recheck all prior results,
but mostly relies on prior science to be true.15 As Jurgen Habermas
might say, dialogue requires a shared trust that my opponent is not
simply manipulating the conversation.16 If nothing that is not ab-
solutely reliable is true, then nothing-not values, not assurances,
not even facts-can be true.17
At its deepest level, the death of truth even reaches the question
whether we can trust reality to yield truth. I have not yet said what
truth is, exactly, because I do not have a definition as such.18  I
mean to indicate by the word, truth, the acceptance of binding au-
thority from which all of us might come to shared meaning and com-
mon ground.19 Truth is binding because it represents the whole of
reality. Or, as C.S. Lewis explained in describing objective values,
it is "the belief that certain attitudes are really true, and others re-
ally false, to the kind of thing the universe is and the kind of things
we are."2 0
That of course is not a definition of truth at all. All we can really
say, a la Wittgenstein, is that truth is what is the case.2 1
14. See, e.g., Bob Cesca, Benghazi Is a Fox News Farce: What the Witch Hunt Reveals
About the Right's Most Cherished Lies, SALON (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.sa-
lon.com/2015/10/20/benghazi is a fox news farce what the witch hunt re-
veals about the rights-most cherished lies/ (discussing the left's view of Fox News' cover-
age of the Benghazi issue).
15. BERNARD J.F. LONGERMAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY 42 (2013).
16. See generally 1 J1YRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 286-95
(Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984).
17. As Hilary Putnam argues, if all values are subjective, so are all facts because estab-
lishing facts depends on values such as reasonableness, consistency and simplicity. See
Mario De Caro & David Macarthur, Hillary Putnam: Artisanal Polymath of Philosophy, in
PHILOSOPHY IN AN AGE OF SCIENCE: PHYSICS, MATHEMATICS, AND SKEPTICISM 15 (Marion De
Caro & David Macarthur eds., 2012).
18. Putnam thought a theory of truth might not be possible. HILARY PUTNAM, WORDS &
LIFE 152 (James Conant ed., 1994) (1981).
19. See HILARY PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY AND OTHER
ESSAYS 88 (2002) (comparing reasons why truth is binding).
20. C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN 18 (Harper Collins 2001) (1944).
21. See PHILOSOPHY IN AN AGE OF SCIENCE: PHYSICS, MATHEMATICS, AND SKEPTICISM,
supra note 17, at 340. The actual Wittgenstein quotation, given by Putnam, is "the world is
all that is the case." But since the project of realism is to bring truth and the world into
consonance, this seems an acceptable alteration. Id.
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But what if we now doubt that there is that kind of truth about
reality or that we could know it if there were? What if there is no
necessary connection between our language and reality?2 2
What happens to public discourse if there is a widespread feeling
that there is no truth in this ultimate sense? When a person sees
truth as possible, it can lead to the healthy political attitude "that
objective reality exists, that people of good will can perceive it and
that other people will change their views when presented with the
facts of the matter."23 But, when that understanding of truth, and
of truth's power of persuasion, is absent, there is no point in trying
to convince my opponent of anything. Thus, the death of truth is
also the death of rational politics.
In other words, if nothing is binding in the sense that it repre-
sents what is real, and everything depends solely on my preference,
then my opponent and I have nothing in common. If all points of
view are arbitrary, we can assume that my preferences represent
whatever is a benefit to me. From this perspective, politics can be
nothing more than hostile camps opposing each other on grounds of
tribal self-interest and identity.24 That is a fair description of where
we are today.
Is it any wonder that, under these conditions, there is such a
widespread attitude of hopelessness and fatalism in our culture? Is
it any wonder that democracy has deteriorated into contests of turn-
out of the base, as opposed to attempted persuasion? Is it any won-
der that we now see rage and political violence?25
The willingness to resort to violence arises out of the absence of
trust in the power of truth and the corresponding emphasis upon
winning at all costs. Whereas Gamaliel says in the New Testament
that if the new Christian movement is not from God, it will not suc-
ceed and if it is, it should not be opposed,26 few people today are
willing to trust reality that way-allowing reality to judge one's own
22. PUTNAM, supra note 19, at 100 (criticizing Richard Rorty for disputing "the ordinary
idea that our thoughts and beliefs refer to things in the world").
23. Richard Aldous, Critical Thinkers: The Ties that Bind Orwell and Churchill, N.Y.
TIMES (May 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/books/review/churchill-and-or-
well-thomas-e-ricks.html?_r=0 (quoting THOMAS E. RICKS, CHURCHILL AND ORWELL: THE
FIGHT FOR FREEDOM (2017)).
24. For a description and critique of identity politics on the left, see MARK LILLA, THE
ONCE AND FUTURE LIBERAL: AFTER IDENTITY POLITICS (2017). It is unfortunately beyond my
scope here to show that it was New Atheists like Lilla who helped destroy the very notion of
a common good to be pursued by political action that led us to the point he now decries and
takes no responsibility for bringing about. See Bruce Ledewitz, Toward a Meaning-Full Es-
tablishment Clause Neutrality, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 725, 742 (2012).
25. See, for example, the shootings of Representative Steve Scalise and four others on




commitments. Whereas Karl Barth said that in Christ is "the end
of the whole friend-foe relationship, for when we love our enemy he
ceases to be our enemy,"27 today we have nothing but enemies.
Whereas Shakespeare wrote that "truth will out," 2 8 we no longer
believe that our fellow citizens are sufficiently capable of self-gov-
ernment that they will eventually realize the truth and act on it.
Democracy requires reasoning about fundamental matters in
public life. If such reasoning is impossible because our ends are
incommensurate and there can only be winning as an exercise of
power, then there can be majority rule, but there cannot be democ-
racy. As Hilary Putnam explained, "We may come to think of his-
tory and politics as nothing but power struggle, with truth as the
reward that goes to the victor's view. But then our culture-every-
thing in our culture that is of value-will be at an end."2 9
These trends of the loss of trust in dialogue also manifest in law.
In law, where we do still purport to give reasons for decisions, in-
creasingly, two hostile ideological blocs on the Supreme Court face
each other across an unbridgeable divide that is no longer rationally
addressed.30 The effort is still made to appeal to objective factors-
precedent or original public meaning or whatever-but no one ex-
pects persuasion or common ground to emerge.
It is not surprising that confirmation hearings for Supreme Court
Justices have become a tissue of lies. Justice Thomas falsely denied
he was a natural law thinker.31 Justice Kagan falsely claimed to be
27. 4 KARL BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS pt. 2, at 549-50 (2004).
28. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 2, sc. 2, 1. 75 (Kenneth Myrick
ed., Signet 1965) (1596).
29. HILLARY PUTNAM, THE MANY FACES OF REALISM 71 (1987).
30. See generally Bruce Ledewitz, Has Nihilism Politicized the Supreme Court Nomina-
tion Process?, 32 BYU J. PUB. L. 1 (2017); Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive:
How Party Polarization Turned the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV.
301 (2016).
31. Charles H. Cosgrove, The Declaration of Independence in Constitutional History: A
Selective History and Analysis, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 107, 160 n.328 (1998) ("During the con-
firmation hearings on his appointment to the Supreme Court, however, Thomas virtually
denied that he was committed to a natural law approach to constitutional decision-making.").
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an originalist.32 Justice Gorsuch stated that his values do not mat-
ter in deciding caseS33 and then, in his first big case-Trinity Lu-
theran Church34-he voted to protect religious believers in a thor-
oughly non-originalist way.35 His values mattered a lot. And we
supporters of these nominees just accept these false and misleading
statements and say nothing about hem because if "we" were honest
and candid, "they" would just take advantage. Our candidate would
get "Borked."
Similarly, in law schools, the trends of political partisanship and
the breakdown of dialogue are increasingly present. The notion of
law as a set of eternal principles that could be searched for, rea-
soned about and discovered, is absent.36 It is not even clear any
longer what knowledge in law school would consist of.3 7 Instead of
a resource that might assist society in resolving its current divides,
law school increasingly just represents the same divides in a differ-
ent setting.
So, the absence of trust leading to the death of truth is a catas-
trophe on many levels. How did the loss of trust come about? That
is the subject of the next section.
III. How DID THE ABSENCE OF TRUST THAT LEADS TO THE DEATH
OF TRUTH COME ABOUT?
If truth died because of a loss of trust, then we have to ask how
that loss of trust happened.
32. Josh Blackman, Originalism at the Right Time?, 90 TEX. L. REV. 269, 271 n.8 (2012)
("During her confirmation hearing, then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan remarked that 'we
are all originalists."').
33. PBS NewsHour, WATCH LIVE: Senate Confirmation Hearings for Judge Neil Gor-
such - Day 3, YouTUBE (Mar. 22, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kWVyrrRsh4U&feature=youtu.be&t=16013. On the
third day of hearings, Senator Amy Klobuchar asked whether a judge's "own moral convic-
tions" do not inevitably play a part in a judge's decisions. Justice Gorsuch answers, "Senator,
I can just say that's not been my experience." Id.
34. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. 2012 (2017).
35. See Bruce Ledewitz, Trinity Case Marks the End of Originalism, INQUIRER (July 7,
2017), http://www.philly.com/philly/opinion/commentary/20170707_Trin-
ity casemarksend of originalism.html.
36. Harold Berman saw this coming a while ago. See Harold J. Berman, The Crisis of
Legal Education in America, 26 B.C. L. REV. 347, 349 (1985) ("Rarely does one hear it said
that law is a reflection of an objective justice or the ultimate meaning or purpose of life.
Usually it is thought to reflect at best the community sense of what is expedient; and more
commonly it is thought to express the more or less arbitrary will of the lawmaker.").
37. Compare the anguished comment of Judge Wilkinson: "It may no longer be possible
to judge a Supreme Court ruling by anything other than result." J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of
Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 257 (2009).
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Some people might say that trust disappeared because we were
in fact lied to. Didn't Secretary of State Hillary Clinton lie about
her email account? And the reader may remember that during a
2009 Address to a joint session of Congress, Republican South Car-
olina Rep. Joe Wilson yelled out "You lie!" when President Obama
said Obamacare would not mandate coverage for undocumented im-
migrants.38 And what about President Bill Clinton, claiming he did
not have sex with that woman?
Or was it President Bush and weapons of mass destruction in
Iraq? Or President Nixon and Watergate? Or, as George Will
claims,39 was it the lies by the government during the Vietnam War
that taught us distrust?
But why did this lying not lead to the public insisting on truth?
Why did it lead Mr. Ameling to believe that it is all lies? Why did
it lead us to abandon dialogue rather than improve it?
It has been suggested that America has been all about untruth,
exaggeration and unreality from the beginning of our history.40
From the Pilgrims to Buffalo Bill to Hollywood, it is said, America
has never been in touch with the real. President Trump's outra-
geousness is just the latest iteration.
I understand this claim, but I cannot accept it. It is a kind of
fatalism. No. Someone like President Trump could never have been
elected before. That is a fundamental change.
Something prepared the ground for our current, all-encompass-
ing skepticism. Perhaps it was technology generally, because under
the reign of technology, from Photoshop to special effects to virtual
reality, nothing is what it seems. Technology taught distrust as
early as the War of the Worlds radio broadcast in 1938.41
But distrust has an even deeper foundation than that. The deep,
encompassing trust that we lack, but need, requires that one feel at
home-with oneself, one's fellow citizens and, ultimately, in the
universe. To trust, we must have an idea of who we are and why
we are here. That is what is now lacking.
38. For the video, see Rep. Joe Wilson Yells Out "You Lie!" During Obama Health Care
Speech (VIDEO), HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 06, 2017), http://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/2009/09/09/gop-rep-wilson-yells-out n_281480.html.
39. George Will, Distrust in Government Rooted in Vietnam Bungles, RECORD (Aug. 2,
2017), http://www.troyrecord.com/article/TR/20170802/NEWS/170809973.
40. See KURT ANDERSEN, FANTASYLAND, HOW AMERICA WENT HAYWIRE: A 500-YEAR
HISTORY (2017).
41. See A. BRAD SCHWARTZ, BROADCAST HYSTERIA: ORSON WELLES'S WAR OF THE
WORLDS AND THE ART OF FAKE NEWS (2015).
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Distrust on this level has been present in the West from the be-
ginning of modernity.42 In the 1 7th century, Rene Descartes em-
ployed radical doubt as a methodological starting point in his search
for certainty.
There was room in Descartes for trust only at one, crucial point.
Descartes felt he could prove his own existence through the very act
of questioning it-the famous cogito ergo sum. But what about the
world around us? What about the existence of other people?
Descartes hypothesized that an evil demon might be fooling us
into believing that there is an outside world.43 For Descartes, only
God, whom he could trust, could guarantee the reality of the outside
world.
But then, that God died. Not for those religious believers who
live in perfect trust even today. Such persons are not the conscious-
ness of this culture.
God died in the sense that the culture, as a whole, including many
so-called religious believers, could no longer relax in the unselfcon-
scious certainty that love and goodness lie at the heart of reality.
The universe was no longer beneficent and caring. There was no
satisfying answer to the question, what is the point of all this?
Art reflects our fundamental unease. In Daniel Quinn's 1992
philosophical science fiction masterpiece Ishmael, a student ex-
presses his deepest feeling that somehow, in everything modern civ-
ilization professes, he is being lied to.4 4 And in the 1999 science
fiction movie, The Matrix, the audience actually watches Descartes'
brain-in-a-vat scenario, come to life on the big screen.45
With the Death of God, the West set about attempting to regain
a reliable foundation for reality in nature: nature around us or hu-
man nature. Two great traditions-science and what would come
to be known as the various forms of humanist existentialism-be-
gan the quest for a reliable foundation for reality-a replacement
for Descartes's guarantee from God.
In the sciences, distrust spurred a search for a completely reliable
foundation for reality in materialism. In this understanding, the
universe is composed of forces-blind, indifferent and cold, but real.
Tables and chairs are really empty space. Algorithms using big
data can predict human behavior. Brain science can account for
42. Distrust of reality could be placed much earlier. After all, even the resurrection of
Jesus Christ does not quite undo the expulsion from the Garden of Eden.
43. See discussion in HILARY PUTNAM, NATURALISM, REALISM AND NORMATIVITY 218
(Mario De Caro ed., 2016).
44. See DANIEL QUINN, ISHMAEL: AN ADVENTURE OF THE MIND AND SPIRIT 27-28 (1995).
45. For a discussion by Putnam of the scenario and its relation to the movie and Des-
cartes, see PUTNAM, supra note 43.
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consciousness. Evolution accounts for love. Our mania for facts
resides here. We imagine facts to be reliable.
What becomes unreal in this scientific account is what Husserl
called the lifeworld-our human scaled world with its meaning and
consequence.4 6 From the perspective of a certain kind of science,
that human world is illusion. As Richard Dawkins starkly ex-
plained in 1995, "The universe we observe has precisely the proper-
ties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose,
no evil and no good, nothing but blind, pitiless indifference."4 7
In the non-scientific account of reality, distrust spurred the same
search for a reliable foundation, but the "foundation" that eventu-
ally emerged was human will in various forms of subjectivity.48
In this view, there is nothing fixed in human nature.49 There is
no objective morality or meaning to existence.5 0 Everything is in-
terpretation and text. And our interpretations are incommensu-
rate.5 1  We are courageous, existential travelers making up our
world. Under this view, humans are free and unconstrained. This
is the humanist/existentialist radition. Capitalism roots here, as
does our mania for choice.
In this tradition, as in science above, the communal lifeworld is
unreal. Only the individual's will is real.
The emphasis on the individual leads to incommensurate life-
worlds. It is not only that each person makes her own meaning, but
that you make your meaning and I make mine.
46. See Daniel R. Williams, After the God Rush-Part II: Hamdi, The Jury Trial, and
Our Degraded Public Sphere, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 55, 95 (2008) (describing the lifeworld
sphere as "those domains in life that we experience with our family and friends, our cultural
life, our political life outside of organized politics (especially party politics), and our voluntary
associations").
47. RICHARD DAWKINS, RIVER OUT OF EDEN: A DARWINIAN VIEW OF LIFE 133 (1995).
48. In this short essay, I am leaving out any reference to Kant's insistence that we are
bound by a law we give ourselves through reason. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT'S
THE RIGHT THING To Do? 109 (2009). I do that not because I denigrate Kant's great chieve-
ment, but because faith in reason to ground even values no longer reflects a cultural consen-
sus. Even in John Rawls, Kantian reason has deteriorated into the principles that we choose
in an original position. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 18 (1971).
49. See Sartre's famous formulation, "Man is nothing else but that which he makes of
himself." JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, EXISTENTIALISM AND HUMANISM, IN JEAN-PAUL SARTRE: BASIC
WRITINGS 28 (Stephen Priest ed., Philip Mairet trans., 2001) (1948).
50. See generally Michael Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 WISC. L. REV. 1061 (1982) for a
description of value skepticism.
51. See Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for
Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505, 2510 (1992) ("Both in commonsense, every-
day understanding and in Western philosophy, including traditional jurisprudence, the bed-
rock assumption has been that we are capable of representing reality more or less precisely
and that some knowledge transcends particular perspectives and contexts. This is exactly
what postmodern thought rejects.").
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This understanding of the ontological primacy of the individual
achieves its perfect expression in the famous Gestalt Prayer of Fritz
Perls:
I do my thing and you do your thing. I am not in this world to
live up to your expectations, And you are not in this world to
live up to mine. You are you, and I am I, and if by chance we
find each other, it's beautiful. If not, it can't be helped.52
The fact/value dichotomy rests in both these forms of scientific
and non-scientific positivism. 5 3 Under materialism, values are un-
real. Facts are real. Under subjectivism, values are also unreal.
They are posited by the individual as expressions of opinion or will
and ultimately of power. In both the scientific and non-scientific
accounts, values are not something one could have knowledge
about. Under these forms of positivism, morality cannot be objec-
tive and cannot be binding. The image of human beings reasoning
toward moral truth is regarded as an illusion.
One way that the binding power of morality is undermined is the
linkage of human beings to the brutally animalistic-although ac-
tual animals are not particularly brutal. Humans are said to be
'Exceptionally Rapacious Primates' in the title of a recent review by
David Bromwich of John Gray's book, The Soul of the Marionette: A
Short Inquiry into Human Freedom.54 The quote in the title of the
review is from the book and is said to illustrate the false human
aspiration to rise above animal nature.
A similar point about humans was made more dramatically a
year before in a review essay by Daniel Smith of Elizabeth Kolbert's
book, The Sixth Extinction: An Unnatural History,55 in Harper's
Magazine. The title of that review was Consume, Screw, Kill: The
origins of today's mass extinction.56 This is how Smith describes the
book's core teaching about humans: "And there you have it, on page
two: consume, screw, kill. The Homo sapiens way."57
Books like these combat what is considered to be an ingrained
human illusion. Since humans are animals, and thus not unique,
52. FREDERICKS. PERLS, GESTALT THERAPY VERBATIM 24 (1969).
53. By positivism, I am referring broadly to the tradition associated with Auguste Comte
that "demanded verifiable facts and dismissed all idealism, including moral philosophy."
George W. Dent, Jr., Secularism and the Supreme Court, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1, 13 (1999).
54. David Bromwich, Are We Exceptionally Rapacious Primates?, 62 N.Y. REV. BOOKS 17
(Nov. 5, 2015) (reviewing JOHN GRAY, THE SOUL OF THE MARIONETTE: A SHORT INQUIRY INTO
HUMAN FREEDOM (2015)).
55. ELIZABETH KOLBERT, THE SIXTH EXTINCTION: AN UNNATURAL HISTORY (2014).
56. Daniel Smith, Consume, Screw, Kill, 328 HARPER'S MAG. 84, 84 (May 2014).
57. Id. at 85.
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the sense of ourselves as unique, which we retain, should be jetti-
soned. Bromwich refers to "Gray's image of man as a fantasy-
haunted being that hungers after illusion." That illusion is "the
uniqueness of human life."5 8
The illusion of human significance could also be described as the
illusion of meaningfulness-not just of our meaningfulness, but of
the idea of meaningfulness itself. The universe is said, as in Daw-
kins above, to have no intrinsic meaning.
Often, the criticism of this human illusion is voiced by critics of
traditional religion. Here is one famed culturally iconic source, Neil
deGrasse Tyson, in the 2014 Cosmos series, explaining this errone-
ous human tendency:
We hunger for significance. For signs that our personal exist-
ence is of special meaning to the universe. To that end, we are
all too eager to deceive ourselves and others. To discern a sa-
cred image in a grilled cheese sandwich.59
One of the most beautiful scientific invocations of the insignifi-
cance of humanity-attempting to counter the illusion of human
significance-is the pale blue dot episode from the original Cosmos
series by Carl Sagan, which Tyson recalled in the 2014 version. I
won't repeat my description of the episode here60-nor the some-
what different sense in which Nietzsche invoked the same image
along the lines of Gray above: humans are nothing special and will
soon die out. Sagan and Tyson were trying to show that we must
care for the Earth because we are alone and the universe is indif-
ferent. No God will save us. They meant well.
But the effect of such a message is the opposite of what they in-
tended. The effect is to instill hopelessness in the culture.61 There
is nothing in the universe to trust.
Law's experience with the lack of trust and the death of truth can
stand as an illustration of what has happened to discourse in public
life generally. In the mid-twentieth century, there was confident
judicial rhetoric of right and wrong. The Brown desegregation de-
58. Bromwich, supra note 54, at 55.
59. See BRUCE LEDEWITZ, The Five Days in June When Values Died in American Law, 49
AKRON L. REV. 115, 125 (2016).
60. See id.
61. See RICHARD WINTER, STILL BORED IN A CULTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT:
REDISCOVERING PASSION AND WONDER 88 (2002).
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cision, for example, was not grounded in history, although it pur-
ported to be grounded in empirical findings.62 That Brown's real
ground is right and wrong is made clear by the companion case of
Bolling v. Sharpe, which held, with no other justification, that it
would "unthinkable" if the federal government could engage in ra-
cial discrimination when the States could not.6 3 That was a purely
moral judgment. Or, think of Skinner v. Oklahoma, with Justice
Douglas' unselfconscious invocation of the basic civil rights of hu-
man beings.64 Truth was not dead then.
Skepticism really arrived65 in American law through the post-
modernism of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, which built on
the insights of Legal Realism. As Dennis Arrow observed in 1999,
post-modernism in law mostly consisted of "linguistic, ontological,
and epistemological agnosticism."66 That agnosticism was on dis-
play in the debates in the 1980's over objectivity in interpretation.6 7
This value skepticism eventually became entrenched in Ameri-
can Law in the view, accepted by all of the Justices on the Supreme
Court in a celebrated five-day period in 1992, which I have called
The Five Days in June When Values Died in American Law,68 that
values are merely subjective human constructs. This view led the
vaunted icon of traditional values, the late Antonin Scalia, to argue
grotesquely that because some cultures exposed unwanted infants,
or disposed of the incompetent elderly, no judgment could be made
about the humanity of an unborn child.69
62. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court stated that the history of
the Fourteenth Amendment was "inconclusive," id. at 489, and that "modern authority" in
"psychological knowledge" shows that segregation has "a detrimental effect." Id. at 691-92.
63. 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
64. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of
the basic civil rights of man.").
65. Previously, there have been scattered suggestions by Supreme Court Justices that
value judgments are subjective, but not to the extent of today's unanimous presumption.
Perhaps Justice James Iredell expressed the sentiment in its earliest form in Calder v. Bull,
3 U.S. 386, 399 (1798): "The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard. . . ."
Iredell's view was picked up again by Justice Hugo Black in dissent in Adamson u. California,
332 U.S. 46, 92 (1947), in which he added that Justices invoking natural law principles,
"roam at will in the limitless area of their own beliefs." Beyond my scope here is the question
of the Constitution itself and whether it does not embody the very distrust we are now expe-
riencing.
66. Dennis W. Arrow, "Rich," "Textured," and "Nuanced: Constitutional "Scholarship"
and Constitutional Messianism at the Millennium, 78 TEX. L. REV. 149, 155-56 (1999).
67. See, e.g., Stanley Rish, Fish u. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984).
68. LEDEWITZ, supra note 59.
69. See discussion in Ledewitz, supra note 30.
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On the left, John Hart Ely anticipated Justice Scalia by twelve
years, in his classic book featuring its skepticism in its title, Democ-
racy and Distrust.70 Later, as Robin West has described, in the
twenty-first century, "[a]ny theory based on an account of human
nature, even loosely understood, appears suspect."71
Quite a lot of the structure and dogmas of constitutional law, in-
cluding the foundations of originalism and textualism, can be
viewed as reactions to the certainty that values are inevitably arbi-
trary and that reliance on values will lead to the imposition on the
country of merely personal preferences by five Justices on the Su-
preme Court.
Ultimately, in the 2003 Lawrence case,72 the logical conclusion of
this legal skepticism was reached: the Court held that morality is
not adequate to justify the passage of legislation.73 In Lawrence,
the popular moral judgment in question was that homosexual sex-
ual relations are immoral and should be criminalized. The statute
at issue was held to fail what is called the rational basis test.
Why is a moral judgment insufficient to uphold a law? At the end
of the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy seemed to suggest that the
problem was that this particular moral judgment was wrong-that
homosexual conduct is not immoral. He wrote that the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment "knew times can blind us to certain
truths and later generations can see that laws once thought neces-
sary and proper in fact serve only to oppress."74 One could then
infer that the "truth" is that homosexual relations are, or at least
can be, morally proper.
Unfortunately, Justice Scalia's dissent is surely correct that,
taken as a whole, the majority opinion actually decides that no
moral judgment can be sufficient to justify a law.75 That is why
Justice Kennedy reached back to the Casey abortion case for the
proposition that the role of the Court is to define the liberty of all,
rather than "'to mandate our own moral code."'76 The implication
was that any moral judgment is subjective-that is, merely one's
"own"-and thus not objectively justifiable.
70. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
71. ROBIN WEST, NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE (2011).
72. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003).
73. Id. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting))
("[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular prac-
tice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.").
74. Id. at 579.
75. Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("This effectively decrees the end of all morals leg-
islation.").
76. Id. at 571.
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Nor is this just the case with abortion. The question of cultural
relativism also arises, for example, in something like the practice of
female genital mutilation. Can we really say nothing about the im-
morality of this practice just because some societies have engaged
in it? That is the moral dead end that Austin Dacey saw coming in
2008 because of the moral relativism of the secular left in America,
which he tried to contest by the reinvigoration of The Secular Con-
science.7 7 This tendency truncates political discourse by robbing it
of its revolutionary possibility, which is a criticism denominated in
The Tolerance Trap by Suzanna Walters.7 8 As Justice Thomas once
pointed out, quoting Frederick Douglass, genuine liberation, includ-
ing genuine equality, depends on substantive justice.79 To be liber-
ating, the notion of substantive justice must be full and not merely
formal.
In 2004, in Law's Quandary,8 0 Steven Smith argued that moral
judgment in law might survive even in a materialistic culture. He
pointed to the gap between truth and our materialist ontology of
forces. Smith described law's traditional notion of the rule of law
as having to do with right answers to legal questions. His point was
that any notion of a legal right answer is inconsistent with our cur-
rent understanding of reality and thus is a form of nonsense.
But Smith noted that, schizophrenically, lawyers retain both
forms of discourse. We still talk about "law" and right answers even
though there should only be interests and outcomes given our on-
tology.
Smith thought that lawyers could just go on despite the gap be-
tween what we think we believe about the universe and what we
say about law. Given the intensifying ideological split on the Su-
preme Court, I am not sure that Smith was right about lawyers. It
may be that such cognitive dissonance eventually leads to aggres-
sion and bad faith.
But, even if Smith was right about the limited craft values of law,
his suggestion that we might just soldier on without confronting the
harmful ontology that we have accepted plainly does not work with
regard to society as a whole. We now see how sick society is. We
will not regain political health until we confront the depth of what
77. AUSTIN DACEY, THE SECULAR CONSCIENCE: WHY BELIEF BELONGS IN PUBLIC LIFE
(2008).
78. SUZANNA DANUTA WALTERS, THE TOLERANCE TRAP: How GOD, GENES, AND GOOD
INTENTIONS ARE SABOTAGING GAY EQUALITY 179 (2014).
79. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349-50 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting in part).




is wrong. Somehow, we must restore trust in ourselves and in the
universe.
The reader may ask whether this is not all an exaggeration? Is
the loss of trust in the universe really that important? It is, because
the absence of trust undermines our capacity to respond fruitfully
to all problems. When, under the influence of the lack of trust in
the universe, we conclude that the moral arc of the universe does
not bend toward justice,81 it affects how we approach everything.
To see this, consider a column by Ross Douthat, the New York
Times columnist, advising both political parties to abandon debat-
ing healthcare in favor of more fundamental matters. Douthat
asked, what is the greatest threat today to the American Dream?
He answered:
First, an economic stagnation that we are only just now, eight
years into an economic recovery, beginning to escape - a stag-
nation that has left median incomes roughly flat for almost a
generation, encouraged populism on the left and right, and
made every kind of polarization that much worse.
Second, a social crisis that the opioid epidemic has thrown into
horrifying relief, but that was apparent in other indicators for
a while-in the decline of marriage, rising suicide rates, an up-
ward lurch in mortality for poorer whites, a historically low
birthrate, a large-scale male abandonment of the work force, a
dissolving trend in religious and civic life, a crisis of patriotism,
belonging, trust.82
The decline of trust is Douthat's last word. Lack of trust is the
American crisis that must be faced. The question is, what can be
done to restore trust in reality?
IV. WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT THE Loss OF TRUST THAT LEADS
TO THE DEATH OF TRUTH?
In that same column, Douthat had suggestions for each political
party going forward. They consisted of the usual bromides-cutting
regulations to spur growth, increasing the child tax credit to aid
81. See Rich Cohen, Why Generation XMight Be Our Last, Best Hope, VANITY FAIR (Aug.
11 2017), https://www.vanityfair.com/style/2017/08/why-generation-x-might-be-our-last-
best-hope (stating that "the long are of history does not in fact bend toward justice").




families, job and income guarantees to promote stability in our com-
munities.83
It does not denigrate Douthat to point out that none of this speaks
directly to trust. A spiritual absence cannot be repaired by a mate-
rialist response. A spiritual response is needed.
Every culture lives from a story.84 For America, it was originally
the biblical story of God's intervention in Creation to bring salva-
tion. Then for a long time, it was the echo of the biblical story, with
democracy and constitutional self-government substituting for the
City of God. Those were stories that evinced trust. But they are no
longer this culture's story.
Our default story today is of an accidental universe of uncaring
forces that led to humans driven by forces. That story cannot sus-
tain a civilization. It cannot promote trust.
If there is to be a resurrection of truth, it will have to begin with
a resurrection of trust in reality. A new story. And it will have to
begin with each of us.
The Canadian Jesuit Bernard Lonergan put the question that
each of us has to answer very simply:
Is the universe on our side, or are we just gamblers and, if we
are gamblers, are we not perhaps fools, individually struggling
for authenticity and collectively endeavoring to snatch pro-
gress from the ever-mounting welter of decline? ... Does there
or does there not necessarily exist a transcendent, intelligent
ground of the universe?8 5
Most of us today answer either that the universe is not on our
side or that we cannot know or that the question makes no sense
because, under the assumptions of materialism, the universe is not
the kind of thing that could be on somebody's side. Very few of us
can wholeheartedly answer, yes, the universe is on our side.
Restoring trust, and thus truth, requires a second look at Lon-
ergan's question. Certainly, it is a theist's question. But there is
plenty of evidence in nature that the universe is on our side. The
big bang shows us there is a tendency toward being. The early gal-
axies show us there is a tendency toward order. Life shows us there
is a tendency in matter toward self-organization. Consciousness
shows us there is a tendency toward intellect. Evolution shows us
83. Id.
84. If it is a destructive story, then the people in that culture will be held captive by it.
See ISHMAEL, supra note 44, at 35.
85. BERNARD LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY 102-03 (1972).
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that, with higher intellect, there is a tendency toward tenderness,
generosity and care. And history shows that Martin Luther King,
Jr., was right-that the arc of the moral universe really does bend
toward justice and that yes, it actually has happened that black and
white children play together in peace. Of course, we make many
mistakes, we lose ground very easily, and racism with all its at-
tendant evils has not been banished. But you would have to be
blind not to see moral progress among humanity.
The birth of the Black Lives Matter movement demonstrates our
progress. Police shootings now provoke a national response that
was never present before. And, when President Trump invited a
harsher police response in a July, 2017 speech, police forces across
the country said, no thank you. 86 Those days are over.
So, what accounts for the lack of trust? It is mostly the old En-
lightenment brief against religion as superstition. That brief seems
to require hopelessness as a badge of intellectual rigor.87 But I have
said nothing here about he supernatural. This is no brief for tra-
ditional religion. There are secular, even scientific, sources that can
lead us back to trust.
One such source is the late philosopher Hilary Putnam, who
spent his whole life charting a middle course between the God's eye
view of traditional theism, on the one hand, and the forces of des-
pair-nihilism, materialism and relativism-on the other. Putnam
argued that although we could not know everything, but we could
know some things. There could not be one true account of reality,
but there could be accounts that are in parts truer than others. Yes,
there are different perspectives, but they are not all equal. In other
words, we have to actively inquire toward truth and that activity is
coherent.
Putnam thought that a relativist like Richard Rorty was really a
disappointed believer in metaphysical realism8 8-that is, in a kind
of traditional religion. If Rorty could not have the certainty of tra-
ditional theism, then he would have nothing. If Putnam is right,
then our lack of trust is in part a fear of commitment to a pursuit of
meaning, because we fear it is not true.
I grant the reasonableness of such a fear. There is no guarantee
of truth or significance, or of any of the traditional values anymore.
86. See Cleve R. Wootson Jr. & Mark Berman, Police Chiefs Across the U.S. Blast Trump
for Endorsing Police Brutality, CHI. TRIB. (July 30, 2017), http://www.chicagotrib-
une.com/news/nationworld/politics/ct-police-chiefs-trump-brutality-20170730-story.html.
87. The pathos of this position can be seen in PHILIP KITCHER, LIVING WITH DARWIN:
EVOLUTION, DESIGN AND THE FUTURE OF FAITH (2007).
88. PUTNAM, supra note 19, at 101.
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Yet, when we dare to genuinely inquire, despite the risk of failure,
we find deep reasons for trust. E.L. Doctorow, through a character
in his novel City of God-Rabbi Sarah Blumenthal-writes that the
essence of humanity is the sense that what we do matters: we all
pursue a teleology that "has given us only the one substantive indi-
cation of itself-that we, as human beings, live in moral conse-
quence."89
Doctorow's claim that human beings experience a destiny is star-
tling. It sounds like an unprovable tenet of organized religion.90
But Doctorow's claim is not aspirational. It is actual, universal
and foundational. Not just Gandhi, but Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot also
lived in moral consequence. All human beings live in moral conse-
quence.
An atheist like Christopher Hitchens, who denies ultimate mean-
ing, shouts out his atheism so that his fellow human beings are not
taken in by the lie of God. A postmodernist like Stanley Fish, who
says there is no text here, proclaims that with exactitude, expecting
to be understood. Both try to live in the truth though they think
they deny truth.
Even the scientist like Tyson, who dismisses the sacred as mis-
placed pattern recognition and an illusionary search for human sig-
nificance, must ultimately declare that human beings engage in sci-
entific discovery "because it matters what's true."91 Not just mat-
ters to us. But actually matters.
In other words, there is no way for a human being to live a life of
meaninglessness. The assertion that we do is really just a bad
habit.
But what does human moral consequence suggest about the uni-
verse? Since this very universe gave birth to beings like us, for
whom truth is so important, we may conclude that this universe
deserves our trust. The British paleontologist Simon Conway Mor-
ris in Life's Solution92 is willing to look at evolution itself as evi-
dence of a beneficent universe:
89. E.L. DOCTOROW, CITY OF GOD 256 (2000).
90. ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY 351 (corrected ed. 1978).
We find here the final application of the doctrine of objective immortality. Throughout the
perishing occasions in the life of each temporal creature, the inward source of distaste or of
refreshment, the judge arising out of the very nature of things, redeemer or goddess of mis-
chief, is the transformation of Itself, everlasting in the Being of God. In this way, the in-
sistent craving is justified-the insistent craving that zest for existence be refreshed by the
ever-present, unfading importance of our immediate actions, which perish and yet live for
evermore.
91. See SANDEL, supra note 48.




"[G]iven that evolution has produced sentient species with a
sense of purpose, it is reasonable to take the claims of theology
seriously. In recent years there has been a resurgence of inter-
est in the connections that might serve to reunify the scientific
world-view with the religious instinct."93
For many people, this resurgence will not lead back to a personal
God. But, if the physicist Werner Heisenberg could speak of the
"'consciousness"' of the universe,94 then it is not incoherent to assert
that the universe wants our truth. As Carl Sagan once put it, hu-
mans are "a way for the cosmos to know itself."95
However, if all this is so, why are we in the mess we are in? How
could truth have died? And what should we do about it?
The answer is that truth did not die, we just lost our way. But it
will be hell to find our way back. We now need the social imagina-
tion to rebuild institutions of trust.
Lonergan called what we need, Cosmopolis, "a redemptive com-
munity that would motivate people on a cultural level instead of
attempting through economics or politics to impose new social
structures."96 Cosmopolis is not a place or even one institution. It
is a loose formation of persons of good will who understand the
source of our decline as bad habits of mind and try to embody social
health in community.97 Cosmopolis would expose distrust and irony
as, usually, just bad habits. In building Cosmopolis, we defeat dis-
trust through working toward communities of trust.
Where should we begin? We have to start where we are, in the
communities and institutions in which we are already situated. Du-
quesne Law School has helped me begin by hosting this very sym-
posium. And I think, in general, law schools, because of their in-
tense involvement with social problems and their mix of action and
thought, are very good candidates, though not exclusive, for a kind
of proto-Cosmopolis site.98 After all, in a constitutional democracy,
where else should the people look for hope but to their schools of
law?
93. Id. at 328.
94. Quoted in BRUCE LEDEWITZ, CHURCH, STATE AND THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN
SECULARISM 225 (2011).
95. Jonathan Cott, The Cosmos: An Interview with Carl Sagan, ROLLING STONE (Dec. 25,
1980), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/features/the-cosmos-19801225
[https://perma.cc/67BM-T5T2].
96. MARK T. MILLER, THE QUEST FOR GOD & THE GOOD LIFE: LONERGAN'S THEOLOGICAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 177-78 (2013).
97. LONERGAN, INSIGHT: A STUDY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 238-42 (1958).
98. For more on the role of religious law schools, see Ledewitz, supra note 8.
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There is no rulebook for how we should proceed. But there are
some guidelines for building Cosmopolis.
First, Lonergan is clear that Cosmopolis does not promote a prac-
tical, political/economic/social program.99 Policy prescriptions are
not how decline is arrested. For law professors this is particularly
difficult because we pride ourselves on taking positions on im-
portant issues and cases. But partisanship is so prevalent today
that all such activity is suspect. Every analysis looks like an argu-
ment. Every paper looks like a brief. I rarely trust what law pro-
fessors write, including my own biases. In this era of distrust, we
have to prove that we are not lying in our public positions, just to
support our "side."100
Second, Cosmopolis is a place for the kind of open inquiry cham-
pioned by John Dewey. There cannot be shibboleths, taboos, pre-
conceptions of any kind.101 That goes against the grain today. In
some universities, there are topics that can hardly be discussed.
Similarly, there are red States in which words like climate change
are practically banned from public discourse. The only way to en-
sure the needed transparency in Cosmopolis is through genuine di-
versity, not only of race and gender, but of party and viewpoint.
There must be conservatives, liberals, capitalists, anarchists, com-
munists-and even religious believers. There must be people in
Cosmopolis who can come to the table with the trust of each of our
disparate communities.
Third, though not emphasized by Lonergan, there must be more
care for language in Cosmopolis than we usually exhibit.
Heidegger, echoing Hoderlin: says "poetically man dwells."102 It is
hard to imagine a poetic law school, but that is the point. A poem
expresses truth not only in its ideas but in its form. Our very lan-
guage must express our reverence for each other and for the uni-
verse. There is a practice in some religious law schools of opening
each class with a prayer. I think, instead, we have to imagine each
class, each encounter, as a prayer. Every occasion a kind of reli-
gious holy day.
99. LONERGAN, supra note 97, at 239.
100. My proposal that law professors cease arguing for immediate case outcomes in favor
of a longer-term effort to develop a science of human flourishing toward which law could
orient itself, see infra, corresponds roughly to the distinction drawn by Robin West between
genuine normative jurisprudence and faux-normative jurisprudence that actually argues to-
ward what the law is said already to be. See West, supra note 71, at 181-83.
101. LONERGAN, supra note 97, at 240 ("[I]t must be purged of ... rationalizations and
myths . . . .").
102. See Paul Douglas Callister, Law's Box: Law, Jurisprudence and the Information Eco-
sphere, 74 UMKC L. REV. 263, 331 (2005).
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We in law school have to be a community that lives the resurrec-
tion of truth. Living the truth is the only way that truth can be
resurrected.
But we cannot rest with trust, or even with truth. Finally, we
have to ask, what is our ultimate goal? We want to restore trust
and truth, but to what end?
V. REGAINING SELF-GOVERNMENT
Self-government is at risk in America today. There is very little
realistic, responsible discussion of issues in public life. What passes
today for political debate is like a fantasy world.
The effect of the breakdown is perhaps most clearly apparent in
the fiscal realm. On the right, huge tax cuts are proposed at a time
of already mounting deficits, with the false claim that such cuts,
whatever their effect on the economy, will not increase the federal
deficit. This is not even defended rationally. Tennessee Senator
Bob Corker sounded absurd when the Republican plan was an-
nounced: "I'm going to want to believe in my heart that we're going
to be lessening deficits, not increasing."1 0 3
Among Democrats, the fiscal irresponsibility is just as great.
There are discussions of single payer healthcare without even a
mention of the cost and difficulty. There is not any suggestion that
entitlement spending might have to be limited. The fact that a
Democrat, President Bill Clinton, last balanced the federal budget
is not embraced anywhere in the Democratic Party as a model.
Just consider hurricane relief in 2017. Billions of dollars were
authorized to be spent and not one second was spent by anyone con-
sidering where the money would come from. I don't mean the
money should not have been spent.104 But, spending without paying
is a fantasy, no matter how just the cause.
Deficits are just one example of the political fantasy world in
which we live. We cannot have healthy debate about any of the
challenges facing us. The capacity for self-government was once
America's gift to the world. Who today would look to America as a
model for self-government?
Worse than just our current incapacity, is our skepticism about
the very possibility, or even desirability, of self-government. The
103. Alan Rapperport & Thomas Kaplan, Senate Republicans Embrace Plan for $1.5 Tril-
lion Tax Cut, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/19/us/poli-
tics/senate-republicans-tax-cut.html.
104. See Filing Season Statistics for Week Ending Dec. 30, 2016, IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/filing-season-statistics-for-the-week-ending-december-30-
2016 (last visited Apr. 2, 2018) (152,544,000 tax returns were filed in 2016).
Summer 2018 43
Duquesne Law Review
sorry tale of the Republican Party in this regard is well known, but
the negative attitude of the Democrats, because it is not so obvious,
may be even more damaging.
For the Republicans, the notion of convincing a majority of the
American people has given way to efforts to frustrate majority will.
These efforts take the form of occasional outright voter suppres-
sion,105 but usually are composed of the legal, but dubious, policies
of gerrymandering and voter ID laws.106 I have actually heard os-
tensibly mainstream Republicans opine that the second-place finish
of President Trump in the 2016 Presidential election is not a prob-
lem because much of Secretary Clinton's 2,868,691 national vote
lead107 was brought about by winning California by over 4 million
votes-as if California voters were not part of the American elec-
torate.
We have to be clear about this. Democracy requires majority rule
over the long-term. All those anti-democratic provisions in the Con-
stitution are meant to function as a limit on majority power, not to
substitute permanent minority rule. If one of our major political
Parties now is willing to live with permanent minority rule-or
even to enshrine it by manipulating the already anti-democratic
Electoral College-the American experiment in self-government is
over. Eventually, the military will take power.
What about the Democratic Party? On this side of the aisle, peo-
ple can afford to laude majority rule because they expect to take
power demographically. So, the strategy is just to get Democratic
Party voters to show up at the polls. 108
Yet, this is to miss the point of democracy, which is self-rule. Self-
rule requires policy-discussion and conscious choice by the people,
not turnout success. Turning democracy into a function of election
technology not only loses elections-as it lost the 2016 election-
but leads to empty election campaigns. I am still waiting to hear
just what policies the Democrats were offering if elected in 2016. I
know that a major issue that I was voting for in casting a ballot for
105. A few examples, like the misleading robocalls that led to the conviction for election
fraud of Paul Schurick, Campaign Manager for Maryland Republican Governor Robert Ehr-
lich are given by Pamela Edwards, One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward: How the Su-
preme Court's Decision in Shelby County v. Holder Eviscerated the Voting Rights Act and
What Civil Rights Advocates Should Do About It, 17 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 174,
181 (2015).
106. See discussion at LEDEWITZ, supra note 59, at 168-71.
107. 2016 Election Results, CNN, https://edition.cnn.com/election/2016/results (last vis-
ited Apr. 2, 2018).
108. See discussion at LEDEWITZ, supra note 59, at 167-68.
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Hillary Clinton-efforts to limit climate change-was hardly men-
tioned on the national stage.
Law school as Cosmopolis is a path to change all this-a path
that leads back to self-government. It does not rest at accomplish-
ing the resurrection of truth for itself. Cosmopolis changes the so-
ciety around it.
The deepest description I know of what a law school can be is
from Roberto Unger, who was not using the term, Cosmopolis, but
who saw lawyers as the agents who could return productive politi-
cal debate to the greater society. He wrote this famous opening
paragraph in his 1996 book, What Should Legal Analysis Become?:
The conflict over the basic terms of social life, having fled from
the ancient arenas of politics and philosophy, lives under dis-
guise and under constraint in the narrower and more arcane
debates of the specialized professions. "There we must find this
conflict, and bring it back, transformed, to the larger life of so-
ciety."10 9
We can do Unger one better. Law School as Cosmopolis can be
the place where a new form of politics is actually practiced-a poli-
tics of trust that aims at discovering and implementing a science of
human flourishing in a benevolent universe through the use of rev-
erent language. We law professors and our students become that
polis. Then that model will be seen and emulated throughout soci-
ety.110
Law schools thus have an inside and an outside responsibility.
Within, there must be intense, strictly nonpartisan debate held to
the highest standards of intellectual rigor and scientific evidence.
But debate must be conducted with care and respect for every mem-
ber of the community and with genuine faith in the future. There
must be total openness and thorough rejection of all the forms of
reductionism-starting with relativism, nihilism and materialism.
Debate must be open to wonder and not wither under cynical gazes.
With regard to the outside, the greater society, law school as Cos-
mopolis must enforce clarity and candor in political debate, partic-
ularly among political allies. We must not be rubber stamps for our
side, but harsh critics of our side. Eventually, the practice of no
sides will triumph in renewed human solidarity.
Beyond that, Cosmopolis does not bring about change directly.
Cosmopolis practices the wisdom attributed, not quite accurately,
109. ROBERTO MAGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 1 (1996).
110. LONERGAN, supra note 97, at 239 (Cosmopolis "provide[s] that witness....").
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to Gandhi-be the change you want to see.111 In our context, the
people will only be convinced by seeing law school as something in
political life that works.
I know I will be asked what any of this has to do with the primary
function of law schools: to train lawyers. The answer is, everything.
Lawyers trained in these ways are the only lawyers America needs
today. Until now, our best thinking about law school's potential to
serve the common good has been to meet legal needs that are cur-
rently unserved.112 That is a worthy goal. But it is far short of what
America must have from its law schools today. Today, law school
must be the place where the very possibility of a common good is
shown to be real.
I don't know whether all this can actually happen, but there is a
kind of historical precedent. It is said that the reason the early
church spread within the Roman Empire was because pagans
looked on the early church communities and were amazed at how
humane and loving they were. Nothing like these churches existed.
They were irresistible to a worn out, cynical age.113
Our age is similarly worn out and cynical. Law school as a living
experiment in a new politics is the only way I know that we can
change that.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Immanent Frame, a well-known collaboration of the Social
Science Research Council,1 14 publishes "interdisciplinary perspec-
tives on religion, secularism, and the public sphere."115 This is the
site of the best thinking that tries to bring naturalism and religion,
or the spiritual, or the sacred, into some kind of harmony. For its
tenth anniversary, the Immanent Frame invited noted thinkers to
answer the question, "Is This All There Is?" on any terms the writer
chose.116
111. Gandhi's actual words were "If we could change ourselves, the tendencies in the world
would also change. As a man changes his own nature, so does the attitude of the world change
towards him.. . . We need not wait to see what others do." Brian Morton, Falser Words Were
Never Spoken, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/30/opinion/fal-
ser-words-were-never-spoken.html.
112. See, e.g., George Critchlow, Beyond Elitism: Legal Education for the Public Good, 46
U. TOL. L. REV. 311, 317 (2015).
113. See, e.g., Helmut Koester, The Great Appeal, FRONTLINE (Apr. 1998),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/religion/why/appeal.html.
114. About, IMMANENT FRAME, https://tif.ssrc.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
115. Id.
116. Is This All There Is, IMMANENT FRAME, https://tif.ssrc.org/category/is-this-all-there-
is/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
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The Immanent Frame is asking the same question Lonergan
asked above, but with more poignancy. Lonergan, the committed
Christian, did not really doubt that there is more than this-that
the universe is on our side. By asking the question, he was trying
to help the rest of us see that.
The contributors at The Immanent Frame, our contemporaries,
are much more uncertain. They are committed to science, to natu-
ral explanations for everything, and yet a number of them are beset
with longing for something more-what Charles Taylor calls "full-
ness." 117
We know from history that robust faith can build a civilization.
We are learning that doubt and uncertainty cannot sustain one.
That is why we are in the crisis we are in.
Years ago, in the book Hallowed Secularism, I observed that the
statement "'This world is all there is' does not represent closure
against a religious view of life."11 Even if we are just matter, it
turns out that matter comes into existence, self-organizes, develops
into life and, ultimately, lives in moral consequence, in us. That is
all we can know, but it is also all that we need to know. It is suffi-
cient to restore the trust that we need to go on. 119
117. CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 768 (2007).
118. BRUCE LEDEWITZ, HALLOWED SECULARISM: THEORY, PRACTICE, BELIEF 75 (2009).
119. I had hoped here to engage the observation by the Dean of University of St. Thomas
School of Law, Robert Vischer, who is a thoughtful and careful practitioner of Christian legal
training, and who kindly read an earlier version of the paper that I gave at this symposium,
that the early church communities shared a robust conception of life together based on the
life of Christ that Cosmopolis cannot have. This very fair critique echoes the fact that Lon-
ergan never put all of his eggs in the Cosmopolis basket but retained a crucial role for the
church. See MILLER, supra note 96, at 182-83. I would answer Dean Vischer if I could. But,
he is really asking the question I struggled with in the book Hallowed Secularism-how does
a genuinely secular civilization survive? We don't yet know that such a civilization can sur-
vive. There has never really been one before. All I can say here is that the starting point for
the survival of secular civilization is a rediscovery of trust in the universe and therefore of
truth. The rest is a path for the future to forge.
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